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I.    INTRODUCTION 
The world has become thoroughly familiar with the concept of robotic 
systems that can operate without human control.  In science fiction, these 
have ranged from helpful computers or robotic servants1 to emotionless, 
unstoppable killing machines.2  However, autonomous machines—those 
that can function with minimal or no human oversight—have become an 
almost ubiquitous reality.  Machines manage stock trades,3 drive cars,4 and 
are increasingly contemplated as a means and method of warfare.5  The 
popular perception of future lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) as 
unrestrained killers has spawned both negative public perception and calls 
for partial or outright bans on these “killer robots.”6  Contrary to the 
contentions of ban proponents, LAWS can be effectively employed in 
appropriate circumstances, in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict 
 
1. For example, the STAR WARS (Lucasfilm 1977) characters C-3PO or R2-D2. 
2. See TERMINATOR 2: JUDGMENT DAY (Carolco 1991) (chronicling a high stakes chase to 
evade an indestructible robot made of liquid metal aiming to thwart an attempt to save the world from 
robotic control); see also Daniel Cebul, Former Google Exec: AI Movie Death Scenarios ‘One to Two Decades 
Away’, DEFENSE NEWS (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.defensenews.com/smr/munich-security-
forum/2018/02/28/former-google-exec-ai-movie-death-scenarios-one-to-two-decades-away/  
[https://perma.cc/7J6N-3R5U] (explaining despite the pendency of AI, it will not dispense with 
human control for critical decision-making).  
3. See generally Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash: The Impact of High Frequency Trading on an 
Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. 967 (2017) (detailing the impact of automated trading algorithms on the 
May 6, 2010, “flash crash” in the U.S. stock market). 
4. For example, Google’s self-driving car concept, now known as Waymo.  WAYMO, 
https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/ (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/5E3E-5J8Y]. 
5. See, e.g., HEATHER M. ROFF, MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL OR APPROPRIATE HUMAN 
JUDGMENT?  THE NECESSARY LIMITS ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 5–6 (Ariz. St. Univ. Global 
Security Initiative briefing paper for Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 
2016) (contemplating the balance between autonomy and human control in the robotic weapon 
systems). 
6. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER 
ROBOTS 2 (2012) (“Our research and analysis strongly conclude that fully autonomous weapons should 
be banned and that governments should urgently pursue that end.”). 
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(LOAC) by implementing a series of control mechanisms and tactics, 
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that are either already in use by the U.S. 
military, or can be readily adapted to the context of autonomous weapons 
systems. 
Proponents advocating for a full ban on LAWS make categorical 
statements contending, “robots with complete autonomy would be 
incapable of meeting [LOAC] standards,” and that LAWS would necessarily 
“strip civilians of protections from the effects of war that are guaranteed 
under the law.”7  Others argue that LAWS violate the LOAC principle of 
“humanity” in war, which requires human characteristics and compassion.8  
Ban proponents deem that “killing at a remove” strips the human aspect 
from war, making it cold, impersonal, and therefore, inherently 
indiscriminate.9  These arguments are based around a belief that war and 
violence are fundamental human endeavors, and that only a compassionate 
human being can ethically and morally make the decision to use lethal 
force.10  This failure of “humanity” in LAWS, many argue, brings such 
weapons within the ambit of the Martens Clause, which prohibits the means 
or methods of warfare that diverge from the “principles of international law 
derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from 
the dictates of public conscience.”11  Many proponents of a preemptive ban 
also employ incomplete factual assertions to bolster their arguments. 
One example of such reasoning is to argue in broad terms that machines 
are, and will always be, incapable of distinguishing between civilians and 
 
7. Id. at 3, 30. 
8. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ADVANCING THE DEBATE ON KILLER ROBOTS: 12 KEY 
ARGUMENTS FOR A PREEMPTIVE BAN ON FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS 15 (2014). 
9. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 40 (“the proliferation of unmanned 
systems, which . . . has a ‘profound effect on the “impersonalization of battle,”’ may remove some of 
the instinctual objections to killing.”). 
10. See, e.g., Holy See, Elements Supporting the Prohibition of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 3–4 
(U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS, Working 
Paper, Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/752E16C02C9AEC 
E4C1257F8F0040D05A/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_Holy+See.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
DYK5-C4G7] (discussing how LAWS can undermine foundations for peace—the mutual trust 
between nations). 
11. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 1(2), opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, 
at 24 (arguing the Martens Clause should apply as a means to prohibit LAWS).  While the United States 
is not a state party to AP I, and therefore not bound by its terms, it does consider much of AP I to 
reflect customary international law.  R. Craig Burton, Recent Issues with the Use of MatchKing Bullets and 
White Phosphorous Weapons in Iraq, ARMY LAW, Aug. 2006, at 19 n.4 (Aug. 2006). 
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combatants, or of assessing intent (e.g., differentiating between a “fearful 
civilian” and a “threatening enemy combatant”).12  This line of thinking 
assumes that because machines were incapable of making such assessments 
as of 2012, that this will always be the case; however, developments over the 
last several years in the ability of machines to assess emotion contradict that 
assertion.13  Furthermore, ban proponents discuss the complexity of 
warfare in an urban environment, citing to the recent counter-insurgency, 
or urban combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, arguing that machines 
would be incapable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians or 
non-combatants as required under the LOAC.14  In light of this complexity, 
if a machine is incapable of balancing military necessity against the danger 
of collateral damage, it may fail to apply a concept known as proportionality 
to determine whether an attack is justified.15  This flawed reasoning is 
twofold.  First, counterinsurgency or urban warfare is one of the most 
complex combat environments, but it is not the only possible environment.  
Secondly, questions about the application of the LOAC concern rules and 
decision-making processes, as well as results.  Reasonable mistakes which 
lead to undesired results are not necessarily criminal or unlawful.  These are 
complicated situations and humans often miscalculate questions of 
distinction and proportionality, mistakenly injuring or killing civilians or 
other non-combatants as a result.16  These logical flaws fail to account for 
the rapid progression of modern machines’ capabilities to perceive and 
process their environment. 
 
12. Such as differentiating between a “fearful civilian and a threatening enemy combatant.”  
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 4. 
13. Sophie Kleber, 3 Ways AI is Getting More Emotional, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 31, 2018), 
https://hbr.org/2018/07/3-ways-ai-is-getting-more-emotional [https://perma.cc/3EMV-QVGV]. 
14. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 30–31. 
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL §§ 2.4–2.5 (2016) for a discussion of the 
concepts of distinction and proportionality.  See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3–4 
(“The rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity are also important tools for protecting 
civilians from the effects of war, and fully autonomous weapons would not be able to abide by those 
rules.”). 
16. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Cent. Command, U.S. Central Command Releases U.S. Forces: 
Afghanistan Investigation into Airstrike on Doctors Without Borders Trauma Center in Kunduz, 
Afghanistan (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-
Release-View/Article/904574/april-29-centcom-releases-investigation-into-airstrike-on-doctors-
without-borde/ [https://perma.cc/Y7U9-6B6J] (describing the October 3, 2015 airstrike on a Doctors 
Without Borders facility that resulted in at least 42 deaths and 229 other injuries as an egregious mistake 
of distinction attributable to human error). 
4
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This article will describe the ways in which many TTPs and concepts 
currently in use by the U.S. and allied militaries can be readily applied to 
LAWS.  Part II of this article will discuss the current state of development 
of LAWS, including examples of some of the various LAWS and other 
autonomous capabilities currently being fielded and developed.  Part III will 
discuss legal challenges and objections to the employment of such systems.  
Finally, Part IV will provide a more detailed description of (1) developments 
in autonomous systems that demonstrate the premature concerns and 
misunderstandings of ban proponents, and (2) a number of precautionary 
TTPs broken down into mission design controls, capability design controls, 
and “cognitive” design controls.  Comprehensive application of these 
controls can mitigate legal concerns with LAWS and ensure their 
employment in accordance with the LOAC. 
II.    THE CURRENT STATE OF AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEM 
DEVELOPMENT 
Despite contentions from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like 
Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), countries continue to press ahead with the development of 
autonomous systems, including systems that are capable of employing lethal 
force.  Prior to discussing the proper employment of LAWS, it is necessary 
to define the term.  For its part, the United States Department of Defense 
defines autonomous weapons as those that “once activated, can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.  This 
includes human-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed 
to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but 
can select and engage targets without further human input after 
activation.”17  The ICRC defines autonomous weapons as those that can 
exercise the critical functions of selecting and attacking targets without 
human intervention.18  While there is some disagreement at the margins, 
the critical pieces of any definition appears to be the ability to select and 
engage targets without human intervention.  With that baseline definition in 
 
17. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13–14 
(2012). 
18. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross Conference on Int’l Humanitarian Law, Report on International 
Human Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, at 44, ICRC Doc. 31IC/15/11 (Oct. 2015) 
[hereinafter ICRC 2015 Report]. 
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mind, there are a number of autonomous capabilities in various stages of 
development. 
The United States military is developing both aerial and maritime (surface 
and subsurface) unmanned autonomous systems for a variety of roles.  The 
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has worked in partnership with the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to develop autonomous air-
launched systems with swarming capabilities.19  This swarming capability 
envisions the use of small, expendable “kamikaze drones” that are 
essentially small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) with an integrated 
warhead and sensor array, that could fly into identified hostile targets and 
explode.20  Defense conglomerate Lockheed Martin is also pursuing 
advances in manned-unmanned teaming.21  Other UAS developments 
include potential combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)22 that are 
capable of launching and recovering from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers.23  The 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has also worked to 
develop maritime unmanned surface vehicles that would perform submarine 
tracking missions for up to ninety days of fully autonomous operation.24  
The development of these surface vehicles has also spawned a pair of 
 
19. Michael Hardy, Pentagon Proves Air-Launched UAV Swarm Ability, C4ISRNET (Mar. 15, 2016), 
http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/uas/2016/03/15/pentagon-proves-uav-swarm-
ability/81803256/ [https://perma.cc/KC5Z-NBX6]. 
20. James Drew, USAF’s Small UAS Roadmap Calls for Swarming ‘Kamikaze’ Drones, 
FLIGHTGLOBAL (May 4, 2016), https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usafs-small-uas-
roadmap-calls-for-swarming-kamikaz-424973/ [https://perma.cc/5U9L-W8C7]. 
21. Yasmin Tadjdeh, Lockheed Martin Investing in Autonomy, Manned-Unmanned Teaming Technology, 
NDIA BUS. & TECH. MAG. (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/ 
articles/2016/3/15/lockheed-martin-investing-in-autonomy-mannedunmanned-teaming-technology 
[https://perma.cc/8LKK-VRYV]. 
22. Patrick Tucker, Report: Weapons AI Increasingly Replacing, Not Augmenting,  
Human Decision Making, DEFENSE ONE (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/ 
2016/09/report-weapons-ai-increasingly-replacing-not-augmenting-human-decision-making/131826 
/ [https://perma.cc/X7E7-LCEU]. 
23. Brandon Vinson, X-47B Makes First Arrested Landing at Sea, USS GEORGE H. W. BUSH PUB. 
AFFAIRS (July 10, 2013), http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=75298 [https://perma. 
cc/X7E7-LCEU]. 
24. Franz-Stefan Gady, US Navy Is Speed Testing Sub-Hunting Robot Ship,  
THE DIPLOMAT (Apr. 5, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/us-navy-is-speed-testing-sub-
hunting-robot-ship/ [https://perma.cc/59Y7-CWTS]; Christina Beck, Check Out Sea Hunter,  
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unmanned subsurface vehicles25 that could perform a range of missions 
including detection, classification, and neutralization of naval mines.26  The 
United States is not the only nation developing such weapons. 
In 2016, French developer Dassault Aviation’s nEUROn long endurance 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) UAV27 was considered 
one of the “most advanced” weapon systems in development.28  Not to be 
left out in the cold alone by its historic French rival, the United Kingdom, 
through British Aerospace, is also developing an autonomous UAV, the 
Taranis.29  France and the United Kingdom are jointly developing an 
autonomous maritime mine countermeasure capability, that will operate as 
part of a network of manned and unmanned surface and subsurface 
vessels.30  Other countries are also developing, or have fielded, weapons 
with varying degrees of autonomy.  For example, South Korea’s Sentry 
Guard Robot-1 (SGR-1) guards the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ),31 
while Israel boasts an expendable “kamikaze” UAV Harpy/Harop32 and 
the underwater anti-mine “Seagull,” contemplated for both anti-submarine 
and anti-diver/personnel roles.33  The rapid pace of development for nation 
states compared to the slow pace in the development of any treaty regulating 
or banning LAWS over the past four years has generated consternation on 
the part of ban proponents.  The national and diplomatic will to ban 
weapons that are so tactically appealing and increasingly widespread appears 
 
25. Michael Peck, Navy Awards Unmanned Wave Glider Contract, C4ISRNET (May 4, 2016), 
http://www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/uas/2016/05/04/navy-awards-uuv-wave-glider-
liquid-robotics/83923664/ [https://perma.cc/W7M8-LVH4]. 
26. Michael Peck, Knifefish Passes Mine-Hunting Test, C4ISRNET (Mar. 28, 2017), 
https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2017/03/28/knifefish-passes-mine-hunting-test/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6AE-MDM5]. 
27. nEUROn Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) Demonstrator, AIR FORCE TECH., 
https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/neuron/ [https://perma.cc/RF8V-FEW6]. 
28. Tucker, supra note 22. 
29. Id. 
30. Michael Peck, Britain and France Move Forward on Mineclearing Drone, C4ISRNET 
(Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/uas/2016/11/08/britain-and-france-move-
forward-on-mineclearing-drone/ [https://perma.cc/LWV6-T2XS]. 
31. Jean Kumagai, A Robotic Sentry for Korea’s Demilitarized Zone, IEEE SPECTRUM (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/military-robots/a-robotic-sentry-for-koreas-demilitarized-zone 
[https://perma.cc/3VXC-P29S]. 
32. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1837, 1871, 1874 (2015). 
33. Barbara Opall-Rome, Elbit Offers Multimission, Unmanned Naval Robot, DEFENSE NEWS 
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to be faltering.34  Non-military actors have also pursued autonomous 
systems such as COTSbot developed by the Queensland University of 
Technology in Australia.35  The COTSbot is designed to autonomously 
hunt and destroy the invasive Crown of Thorns Starfish (COTS) that is 
decimating the Great Barrier Reef.36 
The capabilities of various machines have also improved beyond those 
thought possible just a few years ago.  The proliferation of artificial 
intelligence, including concepts such as machine learning and “deep 
learning” into internet algorithms, social media platforms, and electronic 
commerce, shows the leaps made over the past several years in machines’ 
abilities to “learn.”37  This “learning” includes the ability to move beyond 
simple pattern recognition to “representational learning” where machines 
ingest raw data and discover common features or aspects of a data set to 
allow the machine to accurately classify or categorize items in that data set.38  
In contrast to the assertions of Human Rights Watch and other ban 
proponents that machines will always be incapable of assessing emotion and 
intent, there have been recent advances in the “sensory” ability of machines 
to apply certain “sensory,” or physiological inputs, data, or object 
recognition algorithms to identify human emotions.   
Machines have already shown a developmental ability to recognize human 
stress without physical contact by using digital cameras and facial pattern 
recognition.39  Similar capabilities have also been used to apply pattern 
recognition to human behaviors to identify mental states such as happiness 
 
34. Paul Sharre, We’re Losing Our Chance to Regulate Killer Robots, DEF. ONE (Nov. 14, 2017), 
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/11/were-losing-our-chance-regulate-killer-robots/ 
142517/ [https://perma.cc/G7JH-7G7E]. 
35. New Robot has Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, QUEENSL. UNIV. OF TECH. NEWS (Sept. 2, 
2015), https://www.qut.edu.au/news/news?news-id=95438 [https://perma.cc/HRR2-4HZY]. 
36. Id. 
37. Yann LeCun et al., Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 436 (2015). 
38. DUSTIN A. LEWIS ET AL., WAR-ALGORITHM ACCOUNTABILITY 19 (2016).  Deep learning 
uses the concept of “neural networks” to mimic the functionality of the human brain.  Id.  AlphaGo 
employed a combination of human supervision and learning through self-play, allowing a machine to 
beat a human player at the Chinese strategy game Go some ten years earlier than expected.  Id. at 20; 
Cade Metz, In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future, WIRED MAG. (Mar. 16, 2016), 
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/two-moves-alphago-lee-sedol-redefined-future/ [https://perma. 
cc/3SPV-R38K]. 
39. DANIEL J. MACDUFF ET AL., COGCAM: CONTACT-FREE MEASUREMENT OF 
COGNITIVE STRESS DURING COMPUTER TASKS WITH A DIGITAL CAMERA, in PROCEEDINGS FOR 
THE COMPUTER AND HUMAN INTERACTION CONFERENCE 4000, 4000–03 (2016). 
8
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and depression.40  MIT has developed a system that uses wireless radio 
frequency signals to measure, at a distance, a person’s heart rate.  It then 
applies machine learning and an “emotion classifier” to identify a person’s 
mood without physical contact.41  Perhaps most astonishing, Professor Jack 
Gallant and his associates have shown the ability to digitally reconstruct 
what a person is seeing by measuring brain activity with magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) technology.42  With a combination of MRI technology, a 
sufficient baseline data set for comparison, and algorithms designed to 
sense, assess, and characterize various physiological inputs, and other 
technologies, it is not outside the realm of possibility that machines could 
in fact sense human emotions.  While LAWS that could sense and interpret 
human emotions would certainly assuage concerns about a machine’s ability 
to account for human intent, this is not a prerequisite for their lawful 
employment.  Rather, by examining the relevant legal challenges, it is 
possible to craft a series of control measures that can be readily adopted and 
employed to ensure that LAWS are used in compliance with international 
law.  By employing a suitable algorithm, paired with and effectuated through 
a suitably constructed system,43 it is possible to craft a series of 
precautionary employment TTPs to ensure that LAWS could be employed 
in accordance with the LOAC. 
  
 
40. Natasha Jaques et al., Predicting Student’s Happiness from Physiology, Phone, Mobility, and Behavioral 
Data, MIT (2017), https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/107917/Picard_Predicting%20 
students.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/7KBA-N654]. 
41. Charles Q. Choi, Mood-Detecting Sensors Could Help Machines Respond to Emotions,  
IEEE SPECTRUM (Sep. 20, 2016), https://spectrum.ieee.org/the-human-os/robotics/robotics-
hardware/mooddetecting-sensor-could-help-machines-respond-to-emotions [https://perma.cc/ 
5RY5-THNL]. 
42. See generally Shinji Nishimoto et al., Reconstructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked 
by Natural Movies, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 1641(presenting a new motion-energy encoding model to 
overcome the limitations in MRI brain activity measurements).  Part of the research team’s conclusion 
is that dynamic brain activity, not only visual experiences, can be decoded using MRI technology.  Id. 
at 1641, 1645.  While the ability to monitor brain activity currently requires contact with the subject’s 
head, it may be possible in the future for such brain activity to be “read” remotely from a distance. 
43. Harvard’s Program on International Law and Armed Conflict (PILAC) poses that there are 
“two key ingredients” required for a machine to “make and effectuate a decision”: an algorithm, paired 
with “a suitably capable constructed system.”  LEWIS ET AL., supra note 38, at 15–18. 
9
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III.    LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT OF 
LETHAL AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS 
A. LOAC: The Four Principles, and Challenges Presented by LAWS 
As a foundational matter, there are four core concepts of the LOAC, and 
employment of any weapon system (autonomous or otherwise) must 
comply with those requirements in order to be lawful.  These concepts are 
(1) military necessity, (2) distinction, (3) proportionality, and (4) humanity 
or the limitation of unnecessary suffering.  Military necessity, distinction, 
and the related concept of proportionality are really where the difficulty lies 
with regard to the employment of LAWS.  The concept of humanity or 
unnecessary suffering does not appear to pose an issue so long as LAWS 
employ lethal or kinetic means in accordance with their expected use.44  
Blanket statements regarding distinction, proportionality, and military 
necessity, such as “robots with complete autonomy would be incapable of 
meeting international humanitarian law standards,”45 have led to calls to 
ban autonomous weapons as part of the United Nation’s Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) treaty process.46  However, such 
statements do not account for other possibilities, such as the employment 
of TTPs to mitigate such capability gaps.  Such TTPs could be used as 
precautions in the employment of LAWS to ensure their use is in accordance 
with the LOAC.47  Before proposing solutions, it is necessary to identify 
the legal and practical challenges of employing LAWS. 
The first concept, military necessity, is the principle that “justifies the use 
of all measures needed to defeat the enemy as quickly and efficiently as 
possible that are not prohibited by the law of war.”48  Pursuant to the 
concept of military necessity, those objects, materiel, or personnel which by 
their nature, purpose, location, or use make an effective contribution to 
thwarting enemy military action, may be made the object of an attack.49  
The related concept is the obligation to distinguish between military 
objectives and civilian objects.  This is known as “distinction,” and is in 
 
44. Jeffrey S. Thurnher, No One at the Controls: Legal Implications of Fully Autonomous Targeting, 
67 JOINT FORCES Q. 77, 80–82 (2012). 
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 3. 
46. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 44. 
47. AP I, supra note 11, at art. 57. 
48. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 15, at § 2.2. 
49. Thurnher, supra note 44, at 80; Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in 
International Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 802–05 (2010). 
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essence the capability to “aim” the weapon.  In the context of LAWS, it 
would refer to the reliability of the weapon making the “right” choice in a 
relatively familiar, and well-understood environment, and the predictability 
of the weapon making the “right” choice in unfamiliar or unforeseen 
circumstances. 
This concept of distinction requires an attacker to distinguish between 
legitimate military targets, and civilians or civilian objects.50  Ban 
proponents have honed in on the most challenging warfighting scenario, 
counterinsurgency in urban terrain, in the effort to demonstrate the inability 
of LAWS to comply with the LOAC.51  Based on advances in the abilities 
of machines to sense their environment, and the potential to assess human 
emotions, this may not hold entirely true in the future.52  Regardless, the 
law of war recognizes the obligation to “take feasible precautions in 
planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians” and 
other protected objects.53  Such precautions in the attack may include 
assessing the risk to civilians, identifying zones in which civilians are unlikely 
to be present, adjusting the time of the attack to a time when civilians are 
less likely to be present, and thoroughly considering employment of 
weapons and weapon systems.54   
Through the application of precautionary TTPs based on capabilities and 
circumstances, it is entirely possible to employ increasingly capable 
machines in compliance with the LOAC.  The more accurately machines are 
able to identify physiological and behavioral indicators of physical ability, 
emotion, or intent, and the more predictably and reliably they can interpret 
those indicators in both familiar and unfamiliar scenarios, then it is not 
unforeseeable that autonomous systems may be able to more accurately 
identify intent or emotion than a human being dealing with the stressors of 
 
50. E.g., AP I, supra note 11, at arts. 48, 51(4). 
51. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 13.  Human Rights Watch argues that a machine 
could not tell the difference between a wounded or faking enemy.  However, this is not a problem 
unique to machines.  See, e.g., Kevin Sites et al., U.S. Probes Shooting at Fallujah Mosque: Video Shows Marine 
Killing Wounded Iraqi, MSNBC.COM & NBC NEWS (Nov. 16 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/ 
6496898/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-probes-shooting-fallujah-mosque/#.VzOLPjZf17g 
[https://perma.cc/C2WT-GFUD] (detailing events during the Battle of Fallujah where a Marine shot 
a wounded Iraqi fighter, claiming that the Iraqi was faking his wounds). 
52. MACDUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 4000–03; Jaques et al., supra note 40. 
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 15, at § 5.11 (quoting Letter from Harold Koh, Legal 
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Paul Seger, Legal Adviser of Switz. (Dec. 30, 2009) (characterizing 
AP I, Article 57(4) as “an accurate statement of the fundamental law of war principle of distinction.”). 
54. Id. § 5.11.6 n.372. 
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combat.  In combination with all other factors, this may contribute to 
machines being better able to positively identify lawful targets than humans 
in certain circumstances.  Furthermore, this question of distinction is most 
complicated when dealing with individual human targets.  The situation can 
be simplified if the LAWS employ sensors such as radar identification,55 or 
sensors that can distinguish between enemy armored vehicles and other 
types of civilian vehicles.56 
Lastly is the thorny question of proportionality.  As typically formulated, 
the rule of proportionality requires a commander to weigh whether an attack 
may cause civilian casualties that are disproportionate to the military 
advantage to be gained.57  “In determining whether an attack was 
proportionate[,] it is necessary to examine whether a reasonably well-
informed person in the circumstances of the actual perpetrator, making 
reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could have 
expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.”58  While this 
rule is relatively easy to articulate, in practice, it is much more difficult to 
apply.59  This question of proportionality becomes increasingly difficult in 
light of changing circumstances and dynamic combat environments.60 
The International Committee of the Red Cross has expressed “serious 
doubts about the capability of developing and using autonomous weapons 
systems that would comply with [the LOAC] in all but the narrowest of 
scenarios and the simplest of environments.”61  However, not only 
machines struggle with this assessment, as it is incredibly difficult and 
complex for human beings, as well.62  Despite, or perhaps because of its 
 
55. See, e.g., Harpy NG: Anti-Radiation Loitering Weapon System, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUS. 
(May, 2019), https://www.iai.co.il/drupal/sites/default/files/2019-05/HARPY%20Brochure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V62K-6N22] (“Harpy NG searches, identifies, acquires, attacks and destroys enemy 
radar targets.”). 
56. See ROYAL AIR FORCE, AIRCRAFT & WEAPONS 87 (Brian Handy, ed., 2007) (describing 
technology in a UK employed Brimstone missile when used in “lock after launch” mode). 
57. Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, IT-98-29-T, Judgement, ¶ 37 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003). 
58. MICHAEL N. SCHMITT, ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES 190 (2012). 
59. Id. 
60. See ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45 (discussing the “key challenges” of 
proportionality). 
61. Id. 
62. See Michael Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795, 813 (2010) (“An assessment conducted by the U.S. military 
judged the treaty ‘to be too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical guide for military 
operation.’”). 
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difficulty in application, the rule of proportionality is “an obligation of 
conduct, not simply one of results.”63  More simply stated, Additional 
Protocol I requires states to take “feasible” precautions to verify the nature 
of the military objective prior to conducting an attack.64  At least one expert 
involved in the United Nations effort to regulate LAWS has described the 
obligation to undertake “feasible” precautions as one of development and 
testing of autonomous weapons, and that these efforts must be more 
stringent the farther removed human beings are from the strike/no-strike 
decision.65  That said, a guarantee of results66 would be too high a bar, and 
that is not the standard that the LOAC requires for human actors.67 
Concerns surrounding these four principles, as well as concerns about 
which personnel or officials to hold liable if a LAWS makes the “wrong” 
decision have lead Human Rights Watch, the ICRC, and other non-
governmental organizations to focus on human control as the touchstone 
of the LOAC compliance.68  However, the issue of how much human 
involvement is appropriate is equally contentious.  The DOD requires 
“appropriate levels of human judgment,”69 which at first blush appears as 
less involvement than that advocated by various experts involved in the 
CCW Group of Experts of “effective,” “appropriate,” or “meaningful 
human control.”70  While the specific degree of human involvement required 
 
63. Kimberley Trapp, A Framework of Analysis for Assessing Compliance of LAWS with IHL (API) 
Precautionary Measures, Note to the Informal Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons 
Systems 1 (Apr. 11–15, 2016) [hereinafter Trapp], https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(http 
Assets)/F78EF612C14FC4F8C1258074004DB93E/$file/Trapp+CCW+Informal+Meeting+of+Ex
perts+(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/54UN-LMVV]. 
64. AP I, supra note 11, at art. 57(2). 
65. See Trapp, supra note 63, at 7 (explaining how “everything hangs on the development and 
testing of the technology”). 
66. For example, a guarantee that a LAWS system would never attack a civilian object. 
67. See Trapp, supra note 63, at 8 (stating the standards “is simply too high for such weapons 
systems to pass Article 36 AP I review”). 
68. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that “[i]t is time for the broader 
public to consider the potential advantages and threats of fully autonomous weapons”); ICRC 
2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45 (“In this respect, it seems evident that overall human control or 
oversight over the selection and attack of targets will continue to be required to ensure respect for 
IHL.”); Trapp, supra note 63, at 3–4 (discussing the various aspects of human control in the context of 
artificial intelligence) (discussing the various aspects of human control in the context of artificial 
intelligence). 
69. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 2. 
70. Neha Jain, Human-Machine Interaction in Terms of Various Degrees of Autonomy as Well as  
Political and Legal Responsibility for Actions of Autonomous Systems, Note to the Informal  
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for any particular system is a critical question, it is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  The focus of this paper is whether, and how LAWS can be employed 
in accordance with the LOAC.  One such formulation in response to the 
degree of necessary human involvement question was put forth by the 
ICRC, writing that the “kind and degree of human control or oversight 
required to ensure compliance of an autonomous weapon system with IHL 
will depend on the type of autonomous weapon system, the tasks it is 
designed to carry out, the environment in which it is intended to be used, 
and the types of targets it is programmed to attack, among other factors.”71 
Human control and the four LOAC principles have driven the discussion 
by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for a ban or restriction on 
LAWS.  One such effort is a proposed protocol to the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).72  However, any proposed Treaty 
banning LAWS would require the support of, and ratification by States to 
become binding international law.73  With that understanding,  the pursuit 
of LAWS by many states, at least, indicates an open debate on whether and 
how LAWS can be lawfully employed.74 
B. State Practice in the Development and Employment of LAWS 
Despite the objections of NGOs, and as discussed in Part II of this article, 
states have continued to develop LAWS at an ever-increasing pace.  
Furthermore, states have presented their views on the applicability of the 
LOAC to LAWS, and whether the current rules are sufficient to deal with 
 
05/$file/2016_LAWS+MX+Presentations_ChallengestoIHL_Neha+Jain+oral+note.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8Z9M-Y6TN];  ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 46. 
71. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45. 
72. More precisely this is the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects as Amended 21 December 2001, ratified Apr. 8, 1982, 19 I.L.M. 1823, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 
[hereinafter CCW].  For efforts relating to LAWS, see Background on Lethal Autonomous Weapons  
Systems in the CCW, U.N. OFF. AT GENEVA (last visited June 29, 2019), https://www.unog.ch/ 
80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/68EL-KBG7]. 
73. CCW, supra note 72, at art. 4.  In particular, the treaty or protocol would only be binding 
upon those states which ratify.  Non-ratifying states would not be bound.  Based on information 
presented at the UN Group of Government Experts, it appears unlikely that states, including the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China (many of the largest developers of 
autonomy in weapons systems), would ratify such a treaty or protocol.  See generally Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, entry into force 27 January 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
74. Compare the Holy See, which objects primarily on ethical grounds, rather than the inability 
of LAWS to comply with the LOAC.  See, e.g., Holy See, supra note 10 (discussing the potential effects 
of LAWS and its legal implications). 
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new weapons systems.  The answer expressed in state practice, as well as at 
the CCW Group of Experts, appears from many of the states most involved 
in developing LAWS to be “yes.”  As discussed, the United States, United 
Kingdom, Israel, and France have proceeded with development on a 
number of autonomous weapons systems, including those with potentially 
lethal effects.  Furthermore, Russia has unequivocally stated that it will not 
support any United Nations effort to craft a generally applicable treaty-
based ban on LAWS, which appears based on the Russian policy of actively 
pursuing such autonomous weapons systems.75  
The French delegation to the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) on LAWS has articulated that the LOAC in its current form is 
sufficient to address the challenges posed by lethal autonomous weapons.76  
France points to the requirement in Additional Protocol I, Article 36 to 
ensure weapons that are fielded comply with the LOAC, and indicates that 
any LAWS will be subject to the same review process.77  Despite the fact 
that weapons may be subject to misuse in an unlawful manner, the Article 36 
obligation is solely to assess the normal or intended use of the weapon.78  
With sufficient precautions, including consideration by the commander of 
 
75. See Patrick Tucker, Russia to the United Nations: Don’t Try to Stop Us From Building Killer  
Robots, DEF. ONE (Nov. 21, 2017), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2017/11/russia-united-
nations-dont-try-stop-us-building-killer-robots/142734/?oref=d-topstory&utm_source=Sailthru&ut 
m_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%2011.27.2017&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Military%2 
0-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief [https://perma.cc/JDR8-FWMM] (“Russia announced that it would 
adhere to no international ban, moratorium or regulation on such weapons.”). 
76. See France, Legal Framework for Any Potential Development and Operational Use of a 
Future Lethal Autonomous Weapons System (LAWS) 3 (U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, 2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS, Working Paper, Apr. 2016) [hereinafter 2016 France 
Working Paper] (unpublished working paper) (on file with U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons), https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/C4D88A9E3530929EC1257 
F8F005A226C/$file/2016_LAWSMX_CountryPaper_France+LegalFramework+EN.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BK82-XXSG] (“The current position of France’s prospective analysis considers that the 
development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems cannot be regarded as intrinsically 
contrary to international humanitarian law (IHL).  Any preventive prohibition of the development of 
any potential LAWS would therefore appear premature.”). 
77. See id. at 1 (discussing how LAWS fall within the scope of Article 36’s “weapon, means or 
method of warfare,” providing the necessary IHL oversight for weapons development). 
78. Switzerland, A “Compliance-Based” Approach to Autonomous Weapon Systems 2 (U.N. 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Working Paper No. 9, 2017) [hereinafter 
2016 Switzerland Working Paper]; 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 1;  Japan, Japan’s 
Views on Issues Relating to LAWS ¶ 4 (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter 2016 Japan Working Paper] 
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such factors as potential civilian casualties, the expected military advantage 
to be gained, the operational environment, and the characteristics of a 
particular weapon, there is every reason to believe that LAWS can be 
employed lawfully in appropriate circumstances.79  While LAWS may not 
be ready for full, unfettered employment given the current state of 
robotics,80 when understanding the benefits that autonomy has had in other 
fields such as faster calculations, and lack of emotions such as fear, panic, 
or a desire for vengeance, there are reasons to believe that under the right 
circumstances LAWS could make “better decisions” than human beings.81 
In fact, many of the claims made by ban proponents have been 
characterized as misleading and based on factually incorrect assertions.82  
For instance, many ban proponents conflate autonomous systems and 
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA or “drones”), and then point to the argument 
that “drone” strikes result in higher civilian casualty rates than for manned 
missions.83  The problem with this assertion is two-fold.  First is that 
“drones” or RPAs used to conduct lethal strikes are not autonomous, but 
are piloted by human beings using remote means.  The second concern is 
that some of the comparisons of “drone” and manned missions conflate 
dissimilar situations when making their comparison.84  They also discuss 
“drone” missions outside of battlefields, where they are forced to rely on 
NGO casualty estimates, in comparison to manned missions in “war zones” 
 
79. 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 2–3. 
80. 2016 Switzerland Working Paper, supra note 78, at 3. 
81. Compare 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, at 2 (“Indeed, the use of autonomous 
weapons systems could reduce risks for civilians by making more accurate targeting decisions by means 
of faster calculation of available information and more controlled firing decisions due to the absence 
of negative feelings like fear, panic and a desire for vengeance.”), with 2016 Japan Working Paper, supra 
note 78, at ¶ 3 (“The Japan Ministry of Defense has no plan to develop robots with humans out of the 
loop, which may be capable of committing murder.”). 
82. Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and 
the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 268 (2013). 
83. Micah Zenko & Amelia Mae Wolf, Drones Kill More Civilians Than Pilots Do, FOREIGN  
POL’Y (April 25, 2016, 3:59 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/drones-kill-more-civilians-
than-pilots-do/ [https://perma.cc/UU9H-9XUZ]. 
84. Steven J. Barela & Avery Plaw, The Precision of Drones: Problems with the New Data and New 
Claims, E-INT’L REL. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://www.e-ir.info/2016/08/23/the-precision-of-drones-
problems-with-the-new-data-and-new-claims/ [https://perma.cc/ZJU9-KSK8].  Barela argues that 
when correcting for these analytical errors, that RPA strikes result in marginally lower civilian casualties 
than manned strikes (0.067 casualties per RPA strike as compared to 0.099 per manned mission), but 
that RPAs are getting significantly better in that respect when considering strikes in non-battlefield 
scenarios (a drop from 1.699 casualties per strike in 2009 to 0.036 per strike in 2016).  Id.  
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where government estimates are readily available.85  A categorical ban on 
all LAWS has been called premature, and unsupportable from a legal, policy, 
or “operational good sense” perspective.86  Still, others have argued that 
weapons with various levels of autonomy are already here, making a ban 
untenable in light of the myriad of countries developing such weapons.87  
Furthermore, echoing the comments of a number of countries during U.N. 
GGE meetings, some experts and policymakers have opined that the time 
is rapidly approaching when artificial intelligence will progress to the point 
that human beings are the “weakest link” in the decision-making chain.88  
Not only do these facts undermine arguments that LAWS are unlawful 
under the Martens Clause, they also necessitate real action on the 
development of lawful employment TTPs. 
This being the case,89 I recommend that autonomous capabilities, and 
the precautionary TTPs used to ensure their compliance with the LOAC, 
should be employed on a sliding scale90 where they are inversely 
proportional to one another.  More simply put, the more accurately a 
machine can perceive and process its environment, reliably make the “right” 
decision in familiar circumstances, and predictably make the “right” decision 





86. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 233–34; 2016 France Working Paper, supra note 76, 
at 3; 2016 Switzerland Working Paper, supra note 78, at 6; Tucker, supra note 75. 
87. See, e.g., Jack M. Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
617, 619–20 (2014) (discussing how many autonomous capabilities already exist in the maritime 
domain, and arguing that autonomous weapons are advancing too quickly for law and policy to keep 
up). 
88. See Crootof, supra note 32, at 1867 (indicating this is happening at DARPA); see also Dan 
Lamothe, The Killer Robot Threat: Pentagon Examining How Enemy Nations Could Empower Machines, WASH. 
POST (March 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/03/30/ 
the-killer-robot-threat-pentagon-examining-how-enemy-nations-could-empower-machines/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z3BB-SN3U] (noting Deputy Defense Secretary Work’s comments about only delegating 
to machines when “things that go faster than human reaction time, like cyber or electronic warfare”). 
89. Rather than having express wisdom over whether it is the right thing to do, from a moral 
or ethical standpoint, to rely on fully autonomous weapons. 
90. See Beard, supra note 87, at 625–26 (discussing autonomy as existing on a continuum). 
91. See Alan Schuller, Autonomous Weapon System and the Decision to Kill, JUST SECURITY  
BLOG (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45164/autonomous-weapon-systems-decision-
kill/#more-45164 [https://perma.cc/M45E-EZUA] (pointing to the predictability of a machine’s 
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control measures or precaution.92 
IV.    THE TRAINING WHEELS: PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT TTPS FOR LAWS 
A. Preliminary Considerations for Design and Implementation of TTPs 
In designing and implementing employment TTPs for LAWS, the first 
line that must be drawn is between inherently unlawful weapons and those 
weapons that are used in an unlawful manner.93  Most of the talking points 
put forth by ban proponents are more about the employment of LAWS, and 
the fact that they are not accurate, reliable, or predictable enough for the 
situations in which they would be employed.  This thinking views autonomy 
as binary; a weapon is autonomous or it is not.  Contrary to this line of 
thinking, it is useful to think of autonomy as a spectrum, rather than an 
absolute state.94  That is, there are both various degrees of autonomy, and 
differences in kind when discussing autonomy in different functions.95  
Autonomous capabilities have been described as impacting each step of 
Colonel John Boyd’s “OODA” loop,96 as well as autonomy in various 
systems, components, or processes.97 
It is also apparent that capabilities in a number of autonomous arenas are 
progressing far beyond that believed possible by proponents of a LAWS 
ban.  Machines have shown the ability to recognize individual human faces 
at accuracy rates unthinkable just a few years ago.98  Machines have also 
demonstrated the ability, despite contentions to the contrary, to identify and 
interpret basic human emotions at a distance using radio frequency (RF) 
signals.99  The larger the data set gathered and processed by the analytic 
 
92. See Thurnher, supra note 44, at 82–83 (arguing that, while LAWS are presumptively legal, 
commanders should implement appropriate TTPs to ensure their lawful employment, and proposing 
certain types such as ROE, location of employment, mission considerations, and human supervision). 
93. See Beard, supra note 87, at 636 (distinguishing between inherently unlawful weapons and 
those that are not). 
94. See William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next 
Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1155 (2013) (“As a result, ‘[l]ike 
intelligence and consciousness,’ autonomy is best conceived of as existing on a spectrum.”). 
95. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1846. 
96. Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.  Id. 
97. For example, autonomy to adjust a flight path and autonomy in selecting a target are 
categorically different when discussing lawful employment of LAWS. 
98. See, e.g., Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), Face Recognition Prize 
Challenge (FRPC), IARPA, https://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/working-with-iarpa/prize-challenges/ 
959-face-recognition-prize-challenge-frpc, [https://perma.cc/2QFR-4K7L]. 
99. Choi, supra note 41. 
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algorithm of MIT’s emotion sensing system, the more reliably and 
predictably it can be used to interpret both familiar and new emotional 
states.100  As sensors, algorithms, and processing power improve, there is 
every reason to believe that the accuracy, reliability, and predictability of 
LAWS will improve at a pace similar to other advances in technology.  That 
being the case, there is a relatively intuitive approach to designing and 
implementing employment TTPs to mitigate the weaknesses in any 
particular LAWS.101   
For machines with high degrees of autonomy, current capabilities are 
likely insufficient to simply “turn them loose” on the battlefield.  Thus, they 
would require a comprehensive approach, implementing a number of 
employment TTPs as precautions to account for this lack of capability.  
However, the more accurate, reliable, and predictable LAWS become, the 
less robust or comprehensive would those TTPs need to be.  Furthermore, 
because different systems may have greater degrees of autonomous 
capability in different functions, the precautionary TTPs employed may vary 
from system to system.  Regardless, rather than looking for a single “silver 
bullet” to solve all shortfalls of LAWS, a comprehensive, multidisciplinary 
approach to mitigating their shortfalls should be employed.102  These 
mitigation TTPs can be broadly divided into Mission Design Controls, 
Capability Design Controls, and “Cognitive” Design Controls. 
B. Autonomous Weapon System Employment TTPs 
1. Mission Design Controls 
For the purposes of this article, the concept of mission design controls 
means the employment of various constraints on the missions with which 
LAWS are tasked.  These constraints may be temporally based, spatially 
 
100. Id. 
101. The United States’ position is that employment of LAWS includes the responsibility to 
develop adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine to understand the functioning, capabilities, and 
limitations of LAWS in realistic environments.  United States, Human-Machine Interaction in the 
Development, Deployment and Use of Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems 3 
(Group of Gov’t Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively 
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Paper No. 6, 2018),  [hereinafter 2018 U.S. Working 
Paper].  This requirement includes periodic review by system operators and commanders to ensure 
continued operational relevance, and a thorough understanding of the limitations and appropriate 
circumstances for employment of such LAWS. 
102. Schuller, supra note 91. 
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based, or target based.  The concept is to adequately scope the mission of a 
LAWS to its capabilities in terms of sensory, analytical, and decision making 
capabilities.  The first mitigation method is more of a question of mission 
assessment rather than a TTP.  It is a core tenet of leadership that a 
commander must only “employ [his] unit in accordance with its 
capabilities.”103  The same concept should apply to LAWS, and they should 
only be employed in missions or operational environments commensurate 
with their capabilities to ensure that they are employed in a manner 
consistent with the LOAC.  United States Government policy is to ensure 
that commanders must use weapons in a manner consistent with their 
design, testing, certification, and operator training.104  This requirement is 
to ensure that systems always achieve the commander’s intent, effectively 
leaving the decision of when and whether to use force up to a human 
commander.105  With this in mind, inherent in any operational design is an 
understanding of the operational environment in which LAWS would be 
employed.  If there are portions of the operational environment to which 
the particular LAWS are unsuited, then an assessment should also be made 
as to whether there are certain areas to which they are suited.  The concept 
of time and space106 deconfliction is common in warfighting organizations 
around the world. 
For instance, allied forces often employ the concept of a restrictive fire 
plan or restricted fire area.107  These are fire support coordination measures 
put in place which restrict fires, and the effects of fires, in certain areas as a 
way to establish air and ground maneuver space that is reasonably free from 
the effects of friendly fire.108  United States military doctrine also requires 
an assessment of potential civilian casualties when planning fire support or 
other lethal actions,109 and fires elements are further required to develop 
procedures to minimize collateral damage or effects on civilian objects.110  
 
103. MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION 6-10, LEADING MARINES 2-6 (May 2, 
2016) [hereinafter MCWP 6-10]. 
104. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at § 4(a) (“Autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels 
of human judgment over the use of force.”). 
105. 2018 U.S. Working Paper, supra note 101, at 3. 
106. See, e.g., id. (describing the use of geographic boundaries with LAWS would be employed). 
107. NATO, NATO GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS (AAP-6) 2-R-8 (2013). 
108. Id. 
109. ARMED FORCES OF THE U.S., JOINT PUBLICATION 3–09: JOINT FIRE SUPPORT xv–xvi 
(2014) [hereinafter JP 3-09]. 
110. Id. at II-7, III-15. 
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Part of these precautionary measures include the implementation of 
restrictive fire support coordination, or control measures that impose 
restrictions on the ability of fires elements to conduct lethal action in certain 
areas.111  Such measures include restricted fires lines (RFLs),112 no-fire 
areas (NFA),113 and restricted fires areas (RFAs).114  Of course, if fires 
restrictions alone are insufficient, they could also be paired with maneuver 
and airspace control measures.  These types of measures include boundaries 
across which fires and movement are restricted without appropriate 
coordination,115 or various airspace control measures that restrict aircraft 
travel.116 
Many of these concepts of time and space deconfliction have already been 
applied to LAWS in various contexts.  Appropriate time and space 
constraints on the employment of LAWS can help to mitigate the difficult 
question of proportionality, by ensuring that LAWS are employed in areas 
where they can reasonably be expected to encounter only valid military 
objectives.117  The question of proportionality is highly context-dependent, 
and can vary based on time.118  Because the question of proportionality is 
so context dependent, the answer is to employ LAWS in a manner that 
minimizes the possibility for relevant change in that context.  This can be 
done by making intelligent, informed employment decisions such as 
deploying LAWS in areas reasonably expected to be free of civilians and 
civilian objects.119  Alternatively, LAWS could be employed for short 
periods of time, during which a commander would have reasonable certainty 
that only valid military targets would be within the engagement area.  For 
instance, the South Korean military employs the SGR-1 along the Korean 
 
111. Id. at App. 1. 
112. RFLs prohibit fires, or the effects of fires, across the RFL line without prior coordination 
with the affected force or battlespace owner.  Id. at A-12. 
113. NFAs prohibit fires within a certain, predefined area.  Id. at A-12. 
114. RFAs impose specific restrictions on fires within the area, and any fires that exceed those 
restrictions are not permitted unless coordinated with/approved by the headquarters which established 
the RFA. 
115. JP 3-09, supra note 109, at A-14. 
116. These include air corridors, in which aircraft are confined to travel; restricted operations 
zones, in which the airspace is reserved for only specific activities (e.g., ISR); and no fly areas, in which 
no aircraft are permitted without approval of the appropriate commander.  Id. at A-16. 
117. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1876–77. 
118. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 32. 
119. While such circumstances may be limited in recent military operations against non-state 
actors, this may not always be the case. 
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De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), where human beings can be presumed to be 
hostile attackers from North Korea (DPRK).120 
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems could also be employed in 
defensive roles, and be programmed only to attack targets that meet a very 
specific threat signature.121  This method is employed by the U.S. Close in 
Weapons System (CIWS) and British PHALANX,122 as well as the U.S. C-
RAM.123  The accurate identification of a threat is simplified in these 
systems, as they are programmed to identify the signatures of incoming 
missile or rocket threats, which are relatively easily distinguished from any 
civilian non-combatant.124  Defensive employment also mitigates the risk 
of an improper offensive engagement, as it can be based on very strict and 
specific criteria to identify a threat. 
Another potential employment TTP is to place constraints on the mission 
with which LAWS are tasked, commensurate with their sensor and analytical 
capabilities.  It is entirely possible to have an autonomous system with lethal 
capabilities, but under the circumstances to make the decision that it will 
only be employed in non-lethal missions.  The U.S. Navy is developing the 
Sea Hunter, which includes mine hunting, tracking, and navigation 
capabilities.125  However, it is contemplated that the Sea Hunter would also 
have anti-submarine warfare capabilities, including lethal capabilities, 
depending upon the mission tasking.126  The same is true of the U.S. Navy’s 
developmental Wave Glider unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).127  The 
question of whether the employment of those lethal capabilities is 
appropriate in a given situation must be assessed by the commander, prior 
to employment.  Autonomous systems have already shown the ability to 
combine a visual sensor array, an image library for comparison, an image 
recognition algorithm, and human operator input and refinement to 
 
120. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 238 n.26. 
121. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross (ICRC), Views of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) on Autonomous Weapon Systems 2 (Apr. 11, 2016) (unpublished working paper) (on 
file with the LAWS Group Governmental of Experts) [hereinafter 2016 ICRC Working Paper]. 
122. Beard, supra note 87, at 630–31. 
123. Essentially a ground-based variant of the CIWS.  supra note 6, at 9–10. 
124. 2016 ICRC Working Paper, supra note 121, at 2; ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45. 
125. Beck, supra note 24. 
126. Id. 
127. Peck, supra note 25. 
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recognize targets at a rate of 99% accuracy.128  The same concept could 
also be applied to enemy vehicles during an armed conflict.  If a particular 
enemy vehicle129 has a sufficiently recognizable visual signature, and an 
autonomous weapon is employed in an area in which it is likely to encounter 
such vehicles, then there is every reason to believe that the autonomous 
weapon could sufficiently distinguish between military objectives and 
civilian objects.130 
Facial recognition capabilities are also rapidly improving, and the U.S. 
Government is actively encouraging commercial development of those 
capabilities.131  Chinese132 and Russian133 firms have demonstrated the 
ability—as part of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Agency’s 
(IARPA) Face Recognition Prize Challenge—to identify with high degrees 
of speed and accuracy photographs of known persons, including in 
situations when the photograph being compared is compromised by poor 
illumination, motion blur, or other suboptimal conditions.134  The Russian 
firm has also developed software that has shown the ability to match 
photographs of random strangers on Russian social media sites.135  Just as 
with non-human target recognition, facial recognition software could be 
used to target known enemy high-value individuals.  Once this ability to 
 
128. Evan Ackerman, Poison Injecting Robot Submarine Assassinates Sea Stars to Save Coral Reefs, IEEE 
SPECTRUM (Sept. 3, 2015), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/industrial-robots/poison-
robot-submarine [https://perma.cc/BHE4-UVLC]. 
129. For example, tanks, armored personnel carriers, etc. 
130. Such a signature recognition capability appears to be in use with the United States’ Sensor 
Fuzed Weapon, and the BLU-108 submunition.  BLU-108/B Submunition, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/blu-108.htm [https://perma.cc/CQE3-
L9A9].  Each submunition consists of 4 “pucks,” equipped with a combination of active laser and 
passive infrared sensors to identify target vehicles.  Id.  In the absence of target vehicles, the “puck” 
submunition self-destructs after a given time.  Id. (discussing the BLU-108 component of the Sensor 
Fuzed Weapon). 
131. See Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), supra note 98 (inviting 
software developers to register for the “Face Recognition Prize Challenge”). 
132. Yitu Tech Wins 1st Place in Identification Accuracy in Face Recognition Prize Challenge 2017,  
PR NEWSWIRE (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/yitu-tech-wins-the-1st-
place-in-identification-accuracy-in-face-recognition-prize-challenge-2017-300549292.html 
[https://perma.cc/M4F5-HW4A]. 
133. Immanuel Jotham, Russian Tech Firm Wins US Intelligence Agency’s Facial Recognition Software 
Competition, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/russian-tech-firm-wins-us-
intelligence-agencys-facial-recognition-software-competition-1646588 [https://perma.cc/8PEV-
6WPE]. 
134. Yitu Tech Wins 1st Place in Identification Accuracy in Face Recognition Prize Challenge 2017, supra 
note 132. 
135. Jotham, supra note 133. 
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distinguish is established and refined, then the question of proportionality 
can be addressed by employing these mission limitations in combination 
with the time and space deconfliction concepts discussed previously. 
2. Capability Design Controls 
Assignment of particular missions should also be paired with, and based 
upon the capabilities of any particular LAWS.  For the discussion on 
“capabilities”, the focus will remain on the physical and sensory capabilities 
of a particular autonomous system, while capabilities relating to  
algorithmic processing and decision making will be addressed in the section 
on “cognitive” design.  The U.S. military is actively researching a number  
of non-lethal capabilities.136  These include weapons such as the Active 
Denial System (ADS),137 optical or laser dazzlers,138 as well as weapons 
that use the electromagnetic spectrum to disable enemy equipment.139  At 
a less experimental level, U.S. Coast Guard Academy cadets have tested the 
concept of arming off-the-shelf drones140 with a variety of non-lethal 
weapons such as pepper spray and propeller nets in an effort to  
counter drug smuggling TTPs that exploit the Coast Guards’ “no-kill”  
 
136. Rosa Brooks, Can There Be War Without Soldiers?, FOREIGN POLICY (March 16, 2016), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/15/can-there-be-war-without-soldiers-weapons-cyberwarfare/ 
[https://perma.cc/D87T-MFA7]. 
137. Id.  The ADS is effectively a millimeter wave emitter that makes the target feel an extreme 
sensation of heat, which abates as soon as the person moves out of the targeted area (the “repel effect”).  
The ADS is currently in development as a vehicle mounted capability, and has an effective range of 
several hundred meters.  Although fielded, the ADS has never been employed on a battlefield.  See 
Active Denial Technology, JOINT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/Future-
Non-Lethal-Weapons/Active-Denial-Technology/ [https://perma.cc/A4YU-X2YG] (“Active Denial 
Technology is a non-lethal, counter-personnel capability that creates a heating sensation, quickly 
repelling potential adversaries with minimal risk of injury.”); John M. Kenny, et al., A Narrative Summary 
and Independent Assessment of the Active Denial System, PENN STATE APPLIED RESEARCH LAB. 16 (Feb. 11, 
2008) (describing the normal and intended use of the ADS).  While the millimeter wave technology 
can cause heat injuries (superficial burns) with extended exposure, that there is a wide safety margin 
between the length of exposure that produces the “repel effect,” and the length of exposure that could 
cause either first or second degree burns. 
138. Kenny, et. al., supra note 137.  Used to temporarily “blind” a target through visual 
disorientation. 
139. Id. 
140. Julia Bergman, Cadets Turn to Drones for Non-Lethal Method to Stop Drug Boats, THE DAY 
(March 15, 2016), http://www.theday.com/military/20160315/cadets-turn-to-drones-for-non-lethal-
method-to-stop-drug-boats [https://perma.cc/U8DU-QJJK].  While not autonomous, there is every 
reason to believe that an autonomous counterpart with similar physical capacity could be similarly 
equipped. 
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policy.141  These types of non-lethal weapons and precautionary TTPs are 
specifically designed to limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and 
enhance the military’s ability to separate civilians from combatants.142  
While autonomous weapon systems equipped solely with these non-lethal 
capabilities would not be LAWS, there are two ways in which LAWS could 
be paired with such non-lethal means. 
The first would be to equip sufficiently capable autonomous systems with 
a range of non-lethal capabilities in addition to one or more lethal 
capabilities.  Such an autonomous system could then employ a 
preprogrammed escalation of force (EOF) protocol.143  These protocols 
provide tools and guidance to a service member that can be used to both 
de-escalate situations, as well as to further refine a determination as to 
whether an individual presents a threat.144  By employing an escalation from 
visual warnings, to auditory warnings, non-lethal means, and then lethal 
means, a service member (or in this case, an autonomous system) could both 
avoid civilian casualties and further identify potential threats.145  Another 
method would be to effectively “team” a number of autonomous systems 
equipped with non-lethal capabilities alongside those equipped with lethal 
capabilities, and employing a similarly preprogrammed escalation of force 
protocol.  These courses of action—equipping autonomous systems with a 
range of non-lethal and lethal capabilities or teaming non-lethal systems with 
lethal ones—could be superior to the human employment of the EOF 
protocols for two reasons. 
First, U.S. military members in combat zones are taught that the EOF 
procedures are not a rigid checklist, but guidelines.146  If the situation 
necessitates, a service member may skip any or all of the steps in the EOF 
protocol, and immediately resort to lethal force.147  Because autonomous 
 
141. Id.  In essence, drug smugglers will lay across the engine block to defeat the USCG tactic 
of using an anti-materiel round (.50 BMG) to disable an engine.  Id.  NLW that get a smuggler to move 
off of the engine block could prove an effective counter, allowing the USCG to then employ an 
otherwise lethal means to disable the engine. 
142. JP 3-09, supra note 111, at xvi; Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities 
III-9 (July 31, 2013) [hereinafter, JP 3-28]. 
143. For example, the “show, shout, shove, shoot” methodology.  Escalation of Force Handbook: 
Afghanistan, CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED 61–62 (Dec. 2009); Law of War, Rules of 
Engagement, and Escalation of Force Guide, MARINE CORPS CENTER FOR LESSONS LEARNED 412 n.385 
(Sept. 24, 2007). 
144. Law of War, supra note 143, at 23–26. 
145. Id.; Escalation of Force Handbook: Afghanistan, supra note 143. 
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weapons would not have the same self-preservation instincts as human 
beings, they could more rigidly apply those EOF procedures, even if it 
meant sacrificing one or more of the weapon platforms.  Secondly, if a target 
persists in a hostile act after the employment of EOF procedures, then it 
would assist the LAWS in making the distinction necessary to identify a 
potential target as hostile.148  A sample EOF procedure could be the 
employment of auditory warnings such as the Long Range Acoustic Device 
(LRAD), followed by visual signals from flares or the aforementioned laser 
dazzlers,149 and finally the employment of various non-lethal weapons such 
as the ADS or pepper spray.  The ability to employ this range of capabilities 
prior to lethal force provides critical information which could contribute to 
both greater accuracy in a LAWS’ identification of a potential threat, as well 
as reduced consequences of making an incorrect determination.150  
Autonomous systems, either individual or teamed,151 could be programmed 
to only employ lethal force after first employing each of these EOF steps, 
and thereby failing to neutralize the threat.   
This appears to be a TTP employed by some autonomous systems 
already.  For example, the Israeli Guardian is an autonomous ground system 
that can be armed with a variety of both lethal and non-lethal payloads.152  
In addition, the South Korean SGR-1 is programmed to employ verbal 
commands prior to target engagement.153  While the SGR-1 is not currently 
employed in a fully autonomous mode,154 it does have a fully autonomous 
capability in the event no human operator is available.155  Employment of 
verbal warnings, or any other non-lethal weapon prior to employing lethal 
 
148. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.03E, DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS (NLW), AND NLW POLICY (Apr. 25, 2013 (W/CH. 1, Sept. 27, 2017)) [hereinafter, 
DODD 3000.03E]; JP 3-09, supra note 111, at xvi. 
149. Brooks, supra note 136. 
150. A description of EOF can be found on the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate FAQ 
page.  Non-Lethal Weapons FAQS, NON-LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, http://jnlwp.defense.gov/ 
About/Frequently-Asked-Questions/Non-Lethal-Weapons-FAQs/ [https://perma.cc/9H92-UT 
WU].  NLW provides a solution to the “gap” between auditory warnings (“shout”) and lethal force 
(“shoot”).  Id.  It permits a service member, or LAWS to “detect, delay, deny, and defeat” potential 
threats with greater accuracy and less collateral damage.  Id. 
151. Teaming could include teaming with other systems, human operators, or both. 
152. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1869–70. 
153. Id. at 1869. 
154. Id.  As currently employed, there is apparently always a human operator making the 
“shoot/no-shoot” decisions. 
155. Id.  
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force, by the SGR-1 or other LAWS would appear to be a matter of simple 
programming. 
Similarly, tied to both the concept of distinction and the concept of 
mission design, is the TTP of pairing a system’s potential targets with its 
sensors.  Put another way, this ensures that a particular LAWS only sees the 
target that a force wishes to attack.  Pairing a system’s potential targets with 
its sensors would require the employment of technology which includes a 
library of only acceptable targets,156 and then employing a lethal capability 
only when the LAWS receives specific sensor input that matches the 
acceptable template of that target.157  In essence, only allow the weapon to 
strike what it “sees,” and only let it “see” potential targets.158  For instance, 
the Israeli Harpy/Harop is an expendable UAV that is intended to target 
enemy radar arrays.159  The Harpy/Harop is equipped with a list of 
potential target frequencies, and strikes when it “sees” a radar emission 
signature that matches one in its target library.160  The United Kingdom’s 
Brimstone missile employs a similar capability when employed in “lock after 
launch” mode, in that it compares what it “sees” to a catalog of known 
enemy target signatures.161  The U.S. Navy and Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Administration (DARPA) have also developed an 
unmanned surface vehicle (USV/ACTUV) that is designed to track quiet 
diesel-electric submarines.162  In order to identify potential targets, 
USV/AVTUV identifies and tracks enemy submarines from the surface 
using unique pairings of sonar and acoustic signatures.163 
Machines with remote sensors have also shown the capability to sense 
emotional states such as stress by reading physiological inputs like pulse,164 
or other emotions through recognition of facial expression patterns.165  
Autonomous systems have also demonstrated highly accurate facial 
recognition—including in less than ideal circumstances—in U.S. 
 
156. Tucker, supra note 75. 
157. Beard, supra note 87, at 629–30. 
158. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1874. 
159. Harpy, IAI, https://www.iai.co.il/p/harpy (last visited July 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ 
9YEA-6KHV]. 
160. Crootof, supra note 32. 
161. ROYAL AIR FORCE, supra note 56. 
162. Gady, supra note 24. 
163. Id. 
164. MACDUFF ET AL., supra note 39, at 4001. 
165. Choi, supra note 41. 
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Intelligence Community sponsored research and competitions.166  Jack 
Gallant’s research has also demonstrated that machines are capable of 
effectively “reading minds,” and while that capability currently requires 
physical contact of electrodes with a person’s head,167 it is foreseeable that 
the machines could develop the ability to perceive and process brain activity 
at a distance.  These capabilities undercut assertions that LAWS would be 
incapable of distinguishing a civilian from a combatant, as they would be 
unable to understand human emotion.168  The use of appropriate sensors, 
combined with signature identification algorithms, machine learning, and 
human operator refined decision making also lead into the next discussion 
of “cognitive” design based mitigation measures. 
3. Cognitive Design Controls 
“Cognitive” based controls mean that the degree of automation, or the 
extent to which a LAWS is “turned loose” in the operational environment, 
varies based upon its ability to perceive and process its environment.  
Cognitive based controls is not a new concept, as authors have previously 
identified that the level of automation that is appropriate varies according 
to the task to be performed.  For instance, given the current state of 
robotics169 machines tend to be better suited to repeatable processes and 
predictable situations in which a single, rote response is appropriate;170 
whereas human beings tend to perform at a superior level in uncertain 
situations that require expertise or “intuition.”171  The limitations on 
machines generally relate to their ability to reliably and predictably sense 
their environment, process the inputs from their various sensors, and 
appropriately respond when a situation is new or different from those 
contemplated when developing its programming.172  These limitations are 
based on the fact that most machine learning is based on statistical analysis 
 
166. Intelligence Advanced Research Project Agency (IARPA), supra note 98. 
167. Nishimoto et al., supra note 42.  Part of the research team’s conclusion is that dynamic 
brain activity, not specific to only visual experiences, can be decoded using MRI technology. 
168. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 28. 
169. Or at least the state of robotics in 2014.  Beard, supra, note 87, at 629–30. 
170. Mary Cummings, Man Versus Machine or Man + Machine?, IEEE INTELLIGENT SYS.,  
Sept.–Oct. 2014, at 2, 3 tbl.1.  In the context of LAWS, this is generally termed “automated” as 
opposed to “autonomous.” 
171. Id. at 2, 3. 
172. Id. at 2, 5–8. 
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and pattern matching.173  Without a sufficient baseline for comparison of a 
new situation, this machine learning breaks down.  Given these limitations, 
the level of automation appropriate to a given situation decreases, the 
further a task moves away from learned skills or repetitive tasks, and toward 
the application of knowledge to new or uncertain situations.174  For those 
tasks requiring a higher degree of knowledge or improvisation, 
manned/unmanned teams have produced superior results to either of those 
“team members” acting alone in tasks as varied as chess, and search and 
rescue.175  The U.S. Department of Defense is already evaluating and 
advocating for this concept of manned/machine teaming;176 Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Robert Work described a system in which a manned 
fighter would “lead” a swarm of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles 
(UCAV) in combination with an “aerial artillery” platform.177 
One of the concerns raised with manned/unmanned teaming is that of 
mere human “ratification” of the decision of the machine, where a human 
operator is incapable of second-guessing the assessment and decision made 
by a computer.178  To avoid such an outcome, the type and degree of 
human oversight should be scoped to the capability of the machine.  For 
instance, where an autonomous system is less capable of making the 
appropriate decision, then a system of vehicle-based supervisory control 
 
173. Id. at 2, 8.  This type of learning is sometimes called the “search and filter” approach, where 
the machine processes data until it finds something in its memory that approximates a close enough 
match to its sensor inputs. 
174. Id. at 2, 5–8, 8 tbl.3. 
175. Id. at 2, 8. 
176. Clay Dillow, The Pentagon Wants Autonomous Fighter Jets to Join the F-35 in Combat,  
FORTUNE (Mar. 30, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/30/autonomous-fighter-jets-join-the-f-35/ 
[https://perma.cc/T227-JJTZ]. 
177. Jules Hurst, Drones and the Future of Aerial Combined Arms, WAR ON THE ROCKS  
(May 12, 2016), http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/drones-and-the-future-of-aerial-combined-
arms/ [https://perma.cc/8QAN-924Q].  The “aerial artillery” platform would essentially be a large 
platform aircraft, armed with heavier weapons including both air-to-air, and air-to-surface attack 
capabilities.  Id.  This platform would serve the dual roles of heavy weapons platform, and command 
and control (C2) node for the manned fighter and UCAV swarm.  Id.  The concept is also being 
employed in the civilian conservation arena, yet again, in the form of COTSBot, which currently uses 
an “in the loop” model by relaying an image of a suspected COTS to an operator, and the operator 
then makes the kill/no-kill decision.  However, COTSBot still employs a level of machine learning, as 
it continues to “learn” and refine its identification ability by both amassing a larger data set for 
comparison of suspected COTS, and improving accuracy with human input.  New Robot has 
Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, supra note 35. 
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(VBSC) in which an operator supervises one or more vehicles individually 
may be appropriate.179  Whereas, when individual LAWS become more 
capable, then it may be appropriate to shift to a system based supervisory 
control (SBSC) model, in which a single operator monitors a system 
composed of numerous individual vehicles.180  This model of supervisory 
control has been validated as a means to control swarming vehicles,181 as 
well as the fastest model for integrating/controlling UAVs on aircraft carrier 
flight decks.182  Similar capabilities have been validated in the context of 
civilian air traffic control operations.183  In addition to the method of 
supervision, and the number of vehicles supervised by a human operator, 
the character of supervision should be considered as well. 
There is often a discussion as to whether LAWS would require an 
affirmative operator decision to engage a target,184 or whether it is sufficient 
that a human operator has the authority to override or “veto” a machine’s 
decision to engage a target.185  These concepts are often referred to 
respectively as “in the loop,” or “on the loop.”186  There are several 
concerns with “on the loop” systems, in which the operator would exercise 
only an override.  The first is that, in the absence of sufficient time for the 
operator to independently assess the situation before the machine acts, then 
this effectively becomes an “out of the loop” system, in which the operator 
 
179. JASON C. RYAN & MARY L. CUMMINGS, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF THE INTRODUCTION 
OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT INTO AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATIONS 8 (2019), https://hal. 
pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u35/ATR_CEDM%20final%20R1%20updated.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UEK6-D539].  It may be appropriate to start with “one vehicle, one operator,” and 
shift to having a single operator supervise multiple vehicles as LAWS become more capable, reliable, 
and predictable.  Note, however, that the upper limit of a human operator to supervise individual 
vehicles appears to be in the neighborhood of eight to twelve vehicles per operator.  Id.  Ryan and 
Cummings also evaluated a “gesture based” supervisory control, in which autonomous systems would 
take cues from gestures by human operators.  Id.  This was the least effective form of control and 
appeared related to deficiencies in the machine’s ability to both recognize discrete gestures and process 
those gestures as quickly as either human pilots or the machines taking direction from other supervisory 
systems.  Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Drew, supra note 20. 
182. Id. 
183. Miles C. Aubert et al., Toward the Development of a Low-Altitude Air Traffic Control Paradigm for 
Networks of Small, Autonomous Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, AM. INST. AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS, 
INC., Jan. 2015, at 1. 
184. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 2; Trapp, supra note 63, at 4–5. 
185. M. L. CUMMINGS ET AL., Functional Requirements for Onboard Intelligent Automation in Single 
Pilot Operations, in AM. INST. OF AERONAUTICS & ASTRONAUTICS INFOTECH CONFERENCE 6 (2016); 
Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 235–36. 
186. Hauptman, supra note 178, at 185 n.52. 
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has no real input or override authority.187  Similarly, if a system or swarm 
under human supervision becomes too large, then a human being may be 
unable to process the myriad inputs from all of the disparate individual 
vehicles in order to monitor the total system effectively.188  A final concern 
is that of operator bias in the form of a reluctance or inability to second-
guess the machine.189  While LAWS in their current state likely require an 
operator “in the loop” in order to pass Article 36 weapons review 
muster,190 it is by no means true that this should always be the case.  For 
instance, with certain types of threats, defensive LAWS, such as the U.S. 
Navy’s Close in Weapons System (CIWS) and the Army Counter Rocket, 
Artillery, Mortar (C-RAM) systems, are able to autonomously identify, track, 
and destroy threats such as enemy anti-ship missiles or incoming rocket or 
artillery fire.191   
On the one hand, there is some merit to the argument that, although the 
CIWS and C-RAM are LAWS, they are less prone to mistakes about 
distinction and proportionality because they are anti-material weapons, 
rather than anti-personnel weapons.  They are designed to identify, track, 
and destroy only those targets that move and behave inapposite to humans 
or manned targets, making it either unlikely or impossible to accidentally 
target a human being.192  In fact, this statistical unlikelihood stems from 
modern technology, which is capable of readily identifying the unique 
signatures associated with anti-ship missiles, rocket fires, or mortar rounds.  
As sensing, processing, and algorithmic technology improves, other forms 
of threats may be just as easily recognized, despite the difficulty of their 
ready recognition given current technology.193  Thus, the more accurately 
machines are able to perceive and process their environment; the less reliant 
 
187. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82. 
188. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 19. 
189. See Hauptman, supra note 178, at 186 (discussing the U.S. Navy’s C-RAM system that has 
such quick reaction time that humans have less time for corrective action). 
190. Trapp, supra note 63, at 8 (quoting the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I), of 8 June 1977, art. 36, opened for signature 12 Dec. 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3).  The United 
States has not ratified AP I, but does perform legal reviews on all new weapons, including weapon 
systems incorporating autonomous capabilities.  See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 17, at 8 
(“Incorporating Change 1, May 8, 2017”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 5000.01, THE 
DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 2 (Nov. 21, 2007) (“provid[ing] management principles and 
mandatory policies and procedures for managing all acquisition programs.”). 
191. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1858–59. 
192. Id. at 1875. 
193. Id. at 1867; Lamothe, supra note 88. 
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LAWS should be on the humans, either “in” or “on” the loop, to oversee 
engagement decisions. 
V.    CONCLUSION 
In summary, calls for a pre-emptive, and all-encompassing ban on LAWS 
are not simply premature; they are based on incorrect legal and factual 
assertions about the current and potential capabilities of LAWS.194  
Furthermore, the less capable LAWS are, then the more robust or extensive 
control measures should be to mitigate that lack of capability.  As LAWS 
become increasingly capable, then those control measures can be lessened 
in a way that can more fully utilize the autonomous capabilities of LAWS in 
an operational environment commensurate with their capabilities in order 
to ensure employment in accordance with the LOAC. 
The critical concerns are whether the employment of LAWS comply with 
the LOAC.  The most contentious area of debate is whether LAWS can 
accurately, reliably, and predictably distinguish between civilians and 
combatants.195  There is also the difficult question of proportionality; the 
highly context-dependent balancing of the military advantage to be gained  
against the expected harm to civilians or civilian objects.196  As described 
below, when paired with the appropriate control measures, and employed 
in an appropriate operating environment, not only could LAWS be 
employed in compliance with the LOAC in the future; there is every reason 
to believe that LAWS could do so today. 
 Current autonomous capabilities include swarm communications and 
actions,197 and manned/unmanned teaming.198  Such systems could be 
paired with vehicle-based supervisory control measures, and as they become 
more capable, could shift to a system based supervisory control system.199  
This has promise when considering the improvement seen in 
manned/unmanned teams, as compared to all manned or all unmanned 
teams.200  These types of control measures could also be paired initially with 
“human-in-the-loop,” decision making, which could shift to “human-on-
 
194. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 232–33. 
195. ICRC 2015 Report, supra note 18, at 45. 
196. Id.; SCHMITT, supra note 58. 
197. Hardy, supra note 19. 
198. Cummings, supra note 170, at 2, 8. 
199. Ryan & Cummings, supra note 179. 
200. Cummings, supra note 170, at 2, 8 (demonstrating the superior outcomes from deploying 
a combination of manned, and autonomous/unmanned teammates). 
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the-loop,” and perhaps even eventually “human-out-of-the-loop,” systems 
as machines become more capable.201 
Other potential measures to mitigate deficiencies in the capabilities of 
LAWS include mission design and capability design.  This could include the 
mission with which LAWS are tasked, such as defensive missions,202 mine 
hunting/clearance,203 or targeting only a very specific signature readily 
associated with a legitimate military target.204  A myriad of geographic, 
air/sea space, or fire control measures could be implemented to ensure that 
LAWS only employ lethal capabilities in areas where their lack of capability 
would not be expected to impact the ability to employ them in accordance 
with the LOAC.205  These measures could include employment in an area 
where only hostile threats would be expected,206 or by establishing “no fire 
areas” where LAWS are not permitted to employ lethal capabilities.207  
Capability design controls would include sensor configurations that ensure 
LAWS only “see” the targets that they are supposed to strike.208  It could 
also include the integration of lethal and non-lethal capabilities,209 and 
building escalation of force procedures—the “show, shout, shove, shoot” 
model—into the LAWS weapons employment protocols.  These 
combinations of capability, mission, and cognitive controls must be 
employed in a holistic, and complementary manner to address deficiencies 
in LAWS’ capabilities comprehensively. 
A comprehensive system of control measures, tailored to the specific 
capabilities of a particular system, can effectively ensure that LAWS are 
employed in accordance with the LOAC regardless of the operating 
environment.  Furthermore, it is no mystery that the ability of computers to 
 
201. Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 82, at 235 n.12. 
202. Beard, supra note 87, at 619; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
203. Beck, supra note 24. 
204. See ROYAL AIR FORCE, supra note 56 (describing the ability of the Brimstone missile to 
identify, and lock onto specific enemy target signatures). 
205. See generally JP 3–09, supra note 109, at A-1 to A-2 (“provid[ing] fundamental principles 
and guidance for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing joint fire support during military 
operations.”). 
206. Crootof, supra note 32, at 1876–77. 
207. See generally JP 3–09, supra note 109, at A–2 (“Restrictive measures safeguard friendly forces 
and include airspace coordination areas (ACAs), restrictive fire lines (RFLs), no-fire areas (NFAs, 
restrictive fire areas (RFAs), and ZFs.”). 
208. See Crootof, supra note 32, at 1871 (describing the dedicated precision of the Israeli Harpy 
expendable UAV); New Robot has Crown-of-Thorns Starfish in its Sights, supra note 35. 
209. Either in a single LAWS, or by integrating a LAWS with manned/unmanned teammates 
that are armed only with non-lethal capabilities. 
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input and process data is increasing at an exponential rate.  The majority of 
Americans, and indeed the majority of people worldwide, now effectively 
carry computers in their pockets that outstrip the bounds of the imagination 
a mere twenty years ago.  When paired with the capabilities and possible 
associated control measures mentioned above, this massive increase in 
electronic analytical capability may very soon make machines the superior 
option from a LOAC compliance standpoint. 
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